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Geo-political Implications of Climate Changes in the High North vs.  
the Problem of Legitimising EU Presence in the Arctic Region 
The progressing melting of ice in the Arctic region resulting from climate 
change has given rise to new geo-political conditions on a global scale. The 
prospect of new sea passages connecting Europe and Asia (Northwest Passage and 
Northeast Passage) and the estimated huge reserves of strategic resources under 
the Arctic Sea have made the great powers focus their political interests around the 
region of the North Pole. The region’s situation is additionally complicated by the 
unclear international legal status of the seabed (terra nullius or joint heritage of 
humanity), which has given rise to a dispute regarding freedom of navigation 
characteristic for international waters of high sea. Along with a forecast growth in 
the economic importance of the region (resources and transportation), the Arctic 
has become an object of an increased interest for the European Union, which is 
looking for new sources and possibilities of diversification of resource supplies. 
The European Union, as a non-Arctic entity, encountered a problem of 
economic and political justification for its involvement in the area outside its 
borders. The Community’s stance with respect to the Arctic relies on the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and Denmark’s, 
Finland’s and Sweden’s membership in the Arctic Council. This allows the EU to 
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justify that member states and associated states (Iceland) constitute half of the 
members of the Arctic Council, which is the most important forum for 
international cooperation in the region
2
. Furthermore, in 2012, five countries had 
the status of permanent observers in the Arctic Council, all of them being EU 
member states: Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Poland and Great 
Britain. The fact that all permanent observers are EU members strengthens the 
justification of the European Commission’s application to the Arctic Council, 
submitted at the end of 2008 to grant it the rights of “permanent observer.”
3
.  
The EU is trying to balance the absence of geographic premises for 
participating in the problems of the Arctic region by spending hundreds of 
millions of euro on polar studies and becoming involved in the region by, e.g., 
integrating the issues of the Arctic with its policies: maritime, climate, 
environmental, energy and neighbourhood policy (within the scope of the 
Northern Dimension). The special significance of the Arctic for the EU was 
additionally emphasised by the visit of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of 
the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of 
the Commission in the Arctic (cities of Rovaniemi, Kiruna and the Svalbard 
archipelago), in March 2012
4
. 
 
Evolution of the EU’s Involvement in the Arctic Region  
 
The Arctic policy of the European Union has evolved along with the increasing 
economic significance of the region and the political development of events 
shaping the future of areas around the North Pole. 
The first signal of the EU’s policy was the document of the High 
Representative Javier Solana and the European Commission, Climate Change and 
International Security, addressed to the European Council on March 14, 2008, 
which indicated that the melting of the ice cover will most probably result in 
uncovering new transport passages and international trade routes as well as 
facilitating extraction of minerals in the Arctic
5
. Simultaneously, climate change 
creates new geo-strategic conditions that multiply threats, such as conflicts with 
respect to resources, border disputes and tensions related to supply of energy, 
which has consequences for the “stability of the international situation and 
European security interests.”  
                                                 
2  Iceland unexpectedly suspended accession negotiations with the European Union at the end of 
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On October 9, 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 
management of the Arctic region. The resolution obliges the European 
Commission to include energy policy and security policy in the Arctic Region 
within its schedule of work
6
.  
Another step in developing a European Union policy towards the Arctic region 
was adopting, on November 20, 2008, a communication of the EC, The European 
Union and the Arctic Region, determining the scope of Community’s activities in 
the region. The document presents the geographic ties between the EU and the 
region and commences with a statement that “The European Union is inextricably 
linked to the Arctic region by a unique combination of history, geography, 
economy and scientific achievements”. The Commission presents proposals of 
activities in three areas: protection of environment and climate change, sustainable 
use of resources and strengthening of multilateral management of the Arctic. In the 
third part of the communication, we can read that in the longer perspective “Arctic 
resources could contribute to enhancing the EU’s security of supply concerning 
energy and raw materials in general”
7
.  
On December 8, 2008, the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) accepted the conclusions regarding the European Union and the Arctic 
region
8
; whereas on December 8, 2009, it approved conclusions with respect to the 
Arctic
9
, where the Council accepted, with satisfaction, the obligations and efforts 
of the Arctic states regarding preparation of joint methods and best practices for 
minimising the negative impact on the environment resulting from the exploitation 
of natural resources in the Arctic.  
Since the second decade of the 21
st
 century, Arctic affairs have formed a part of 
the work agenda of all major EU institutions. On January 20, 2011, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution entitled Sustainable EU Policy for the High North, 
in which it states that the retreat of sea ice and potential application of new 
technologies will probably lead to the exploration of natural resources, mainly gas, 
crude oil and other minerals
10
. Thence, it recommends that interested parties 
undertake activities aimed at implementing safety measures and environmental 
protection standards in the process of research and exploration of deposits.  
A joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of June 
26, 2012 has had special significance in the development of the EU’s Arctic policy 
to date. It presents arguments in favour of increasing the EU’s involvement in 
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8  Council Conclusions on the European Union and the Arctic Region, 2914th Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting, Brussels 8.12.2008; Draft Council conclusions and the Arctic Region, 4 
December 2008, 16826/08. 
9  Council conclusions on Arctic issues, 2985th Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 
8.12.2009. 
10  A sustainable EU policy for the High North, Official Journal of the EU, C 136 E/71, 11.5.2012. 
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issues regarding the Arctic.
11
 The main goals of the EU’s activities for the Arctic 
include:  
− fighting climate change and research on the natural environment of the Arctic; 
− investing in sustainable development in the North; 
− reducing uncertainties regarding future development and monitoring changes 
in the Arctic region; 
− shipping and maritime safety. 
The EC bases its concept of involvement in the region on three pillars: 
knowledge (scientific studies), responsibility (economic development in the 
Arctic relying on sustainable use of resources and expert knowledge regarding the 
natural environment) along with engagement and dialogue with the countries of 
the Arctic region, indigenous peoples and other partners. 
The document emphasises that the Arctic states and the EU are jointly 
interested in ensuring sustainable use of the natural resources of the Arctic – on 
land, at sea and on and below the sea bed. The document states: “The EU will 
work with Arctic partners and private partners to develop environmentally 
friendly, low-risk technologies that could be used by extraction industries (...) the 
EU (...) has an interest in the resource development policy in the Arctic states (…) 
As a priority, within the scope of the external pillar of the Raw Materials Strategy, 
the EU will actively pursue a raw materials diplomacy with relevant Arctic states 
with a view to securing access to raw materials, notably through strategic 
partnerships and policy dialogue”
12
. 
According to the document, in exploration and commercial extraction of Arctic 
resources, the EU will join forces with partners from the private sector. This 
declaration is a very bold and controversial step on the part of European 
institutions, bearing in mind the Community’s commitments to the protection of 
the environment and biological diversity.  
Motives for the EU’s Engagement in the Arctic Region and Divergent 
Interests of Member States 
The European Union considers itself “an Arctic entity”, and its policy with 
respect to the Arctic relies on the following elements:
13
 
− ensuring protection and preservation of Arctic resources along with its 
inhabitants with respect to the progressing effects of climate change, including 
their potential impact on fishing; 
− promoting sustainable use of natural resources; 
                                                 
11  Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council Developing a European Union 
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JOIN(2012) 19 final. 
12  Ibidem, p. 9-10.  
13  Interests and roles of non-Arctic states in the Arctic, seminar presented by the National Capital 
Branch of the Canadian International Council and the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, 
Ottawa, October 5, 2011, p. 7. 
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− contributing to better management in the Arctic by implementing relevant 
agreements, frameworks and legal principles; 
− regulating maritime exploitation and fishing in the Arctic, which will not 
hinder the access of non-Arctic states. 
The EU expressed these political goals in subsequent resolutions of the 
European Parliament, communications of the Council and applications of the 
Commission. An analysis of the EU postulates referring to the Arctic allows for 
distinguishing two categories of Brussels’ engagement in the region: a combination 
of environmental protection aspirations and economic interests.  
The EU emphasises its leading role in global efforts to counteract climate 
change in order to legitimise its engagement in the Arctic. Brussels has made 
counteracting the effects of climate change and scientific studies the main 
arguments for increasing its presence in the region. Solving environmental 
protection problems has become a specific “key” for participating in the issues of 
the Arctic, confirmed in subsequent EU documents regarding the region. However, 
the EU’s interest in the Arctic is not only driven by environmental reasons, but 
primarily by economic ones, including energy; its presence in the region has 
strategic importance. With respect to the growing significance of the Arctic, EU 
member states are more and more motivated by the fear of losing control over 
regulating the right to free passage across the Arctic Ocean and the loss of benefits 
and marginalisation in the potential fight for resources. 
The European Union, whose 90% of external trade exchange is conducted by 
sea, aims at securing transit routes and the legal aspects of navigation in the Arctic 
territories
14
. In April 2010, a study of this problem was published; in its 
conclusions, we can read that “An analysis of the global component of the legal 
regime for Arctic marine shipping reveals that this framework is not sufficiently 
tailored to the special nature and risks of marine shipping in the Arctic. (…) there 
are a range of disagreements on issues within the international law of the sea”
15
. 
The EU is in favour of multilateral regulation of marine shipping in the area of the 
Arctic; however, this is along with safeguarding liberty and the right of free 
passage.  
The second motivator for the EU’s strategic presence in the region is the huge 
potential of gas and crude oil deposits under the Arctic Sea. The EU is the largest 
importer of energy in the world, and the scale of import dependence in 2010 
amounted to 52.7% (Denmark is the only member state with negative dependence 
growth)
16
. The objective of the EU is diversification of energy supplies and 
extending access to resources.  
                                                 
14  Developing a European Union Policy.., op.cit., p. 4. 
15  European Commission Legal Aspects of Arctic Shipping, No. FISH/2006/09 – LOT2, February 
2010. The United States and several EU member states believe that the Northwest Passage, or at 
least some of its routes, is subject to the transit regime, whereas the stance of Canada and Russia is 
more inclined towards recognising the absolute power of coastal states on extensive coastal waters 
of the territorial sea in line with Art. 234 of the Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  
16EU energy in figures, Statistical Pocketbook 2012, EC 2012, p. 20.  
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Drivers and Brakemen of EU Arctic Policy:  
Problem of the Discrepancy of Interests of EU Member States  
The EU has vital interests in the Arctic region, and its activities are aimed at 
restraining and balancing Russian influence in the region, even though these 
aspects are not clearly listed in EU Arctic documents. Russia is the main player in 
the great struggle for power in the Polar Circle, and only a unified front of the 
remaining members and observers in the Arctic Council and the EU’s involvement 
within the scope of the Northern Dimension may keep Russia’s activities in the 
region “under control.” A clash of national interests with community interests as 
well as the absence of a cohesive joint approach of individual member states 
reveal the limited efficiency of the impact of European institutions on Arctic 
issues
17
. 
Finland, Sweden  
Finland, which was the initiator of the Northern Dimension, is the most active 
member of the European Union as far as the Community’s Arctic policy is 
concerned. Finland included a postulate of the EU’s development in the region in 
its strategy - Arctic 2010, where it was stated that the country “welcomes the fact 
that the Union pays increasing attention to Arctic issues”
18
. Such a policy results 
from a drive to strengthen the EU’s impact on safety issues in the Arctic, which 
supports Finland with respect to their Russian neighbour and secures its interests. 
Sweden, similarly to Finland, does not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean, 
yet, on account of its geographic location, it is significantly active with respect to 
the High North. Sweden announced its first Arctic strategy at the beginning of 
2011 and also voiced its support for the active role of the EU in the region.  
A document entitled “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region” sets out the 
priorities, objectives and manners of meeting them
19
. Sweden, with satisfaction, 
supports the “gradual development of EU policy in Arctic issues.” Among the 
main goals of cooperation in the Arctic, the document indicates “support for 
development of EU policy with respect to the Arctic and promotion of the EU as  
a proper partner for cooperation in issues regarding the Arctic.” Sweden supports 
the application of the European Commission for obtaining the status of permanent 
observer in the Arctic Council. 
 
 
                                                 
17K. Keil, The EU in the Arctic ‘Game’- The Concert of Arctic Actors and the EU’s Newcomer Role, 
Paper for SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 2010, p. 28. 
18  Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 9, http://www.geopoliticsnorth.org/images/stories 
/attachments/Finland.pdf, web. January 05 2013 
19  Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region 2011-2013, http://www.government.se/content/ 
1/c6/18/61/74/9168f21a.pdf, accessed on 10.01.2013.  
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Germany 
 
Germany has an observer status in the Arctic Council, yet it has not announced 
any official Arctic Policy. The department of defence, foreign affairs and 
environmental protection are responsible for Arctic policy. Germany also pursues 
Arctic policy via the EU and intensely invests in polar research programmes. The 
German government emphasises that climate changes will intensify the probability 
of political and security risks, which could influence European interests (conflict 
with respect to resources, shortages of food and legal disputes regarding 
borders)
20
. 
Germany is particularly interested in being present in the region on account of 
the size of its trade fleet. The fact that German trading vessels were the first to sail 
the Northwest Passage is a clear proof to Berlin’s interest in Arctic issues
21
. Approx. 
90% of the external trade of Germany is transported via sea trade routes. Outside-
European trade constitutes approx. 30% of German import and export, whereas trade 
with Asia accounts for 15% of export and 20% of import; thus the possibility of 
opening trade routes in the Arctic is of particular importance
22
. German policy with 
respect to the Arctic has to promote the following objectives
 23
: 
− freedom of scientific research; 
− freedom of navigation (Germany has the third largest trade fleet in the world); 
− access to new energy resources (Germany can boast of advanced technologies 
enabling extraction); 
− guarantee for compliance with rigid environmental standards and in case of 
any damages to the environment, liability for their removal. 
On account of the expected departure of Germany from nuclear energy, it 
seems probable that the import of gas and, therefore, the country’s energy 
dependence will grow in the nearest future. Germany is also an important partner 
for Russian and Norwegian energy companies on account of know-how and 
technical possibilities for exploiting sea reserves in the Arctic. The RWE concern 
is involved in the Norwegian oil field Snohvir; Wintershall cooperates with 
Gazprom in extraction of gas from several oil fields in the region, whereas E.ON-
Ruhgas is strongly involved in the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field
24
. Similarly to other 
EU member states, Germany is also interested in storing nuclear waste in the 
Russian part of the Arctic.  
 
 
                                                 
20  C. Major, S. Steinicke, EU Member States’ Perceptions of the Security Relevance of the High 
North, Working Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin 2011, p. 11. 
21  The Washington magazine “Foreign Policy” considered the most important unnoticed event of 
2009 as the feat of two German trade vessels of Beluga, which sailed through the North-Eastern 
Passage from South Korea, along Siberia in the direction of Rotterdam. 
22  C. Major, S. Steinicke, EU Member States.., op.cit., p. 8-9. 
23  Interests and roles of non-Arctic states.., op.cit., p. 8. 
24  C. Major, S. Steinicke, EU Member States.., op.cit., p. 8. 
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France 
 
The Arctic also opens up new economic possibilities for the non-Arctic France, 
which has ambitions and vital interest to be an active participant in this new geo-
political space. French interests in the Arctic encompass
25
: 
− problem of climate change and their results (including the interests of 
fishermen); 
− issue of sea security; 
− economic activity in the Arctic (e.g. oil concern Total); 
− broader geo-political interests (militarisation aspect of the High North).  
An expression of strategic interest in the region was the appointment of 
Michael Rocard, in March 2009, as ambassador of the Arctic and the Antarctic
26
. 
Rocard, who was for freedom of navigation in the Northern Passage, recognised 
the right of coastal states to exploit mineral resources, yet emphasised that the 
future of the Arctic was an international issue on account of the threat of potential 
damage from extraction activities
27
. The effects of diminishing biodiversity would 
concern all people – he said: “We would like the Arctic Council to take these 
issues into account and reflect them in the decision-making process. France and 
Europe are ready to help, and our financial potential may be useful for the 
necessary infrastructure”
28
.  
France’s economic interests are extensive (communication, transport, fishing, 
mining industry, export of renewable energy technologies). The French 
government has extensive strategic interests in placing French energy companies 
in the Arctic, where the country may become an important exporter of key 
technologies for extraction of natural resources in the region
29
. GDF Suez and 
Total are present and aim for increasing their presence in the Northern Sea. GDF 
Suez E&P Norge has been active in Norway since 2001 (exploration, exploitation, 
transport of crude oil and gas in the Norwegian Continental Shelf). In 2001, GDF 
acquired shares in the Njord gas field (20%); it also holds 20% shares in the crude 
oil extraction project “Hyme.” In 2003, GDF Suez E&P Norge acquired 30% 
shares in the Gjøa gas field in the Northern Sea.
30
 Concerns Total E&P Norge 
(25%) and GDF Suez E&P Norge (12%) are also shareholders of three licenses for 
extraction of gas from the Snøhvit bed in the Barents Sea. In total, GDF Suez E&P 
                                                 
25  Interests and roles of non-Arctic states.., op.cit., p. 10. 
26  Rocard nommé ambassadeur de France en Arctique, Le Nouvel Observateur, 18.03.2009. 
27  J. –M. Collin, Arctique, La France prend position, La revue géopolitique online, September 26 
2010, http://www.diploweb.com/Arctique-la-France-prend-position.html, web. January 20 2013. 
28  Discours de Michel Rocard, ambassadeur de France chargé des négociations internationales 
relatives aux pôles Arctique et Antarctique, 9.11.2010, http://www.ambafrance-ru.org/Discours-
de-Michel-Rocard, accessed on 15.01.2013.  
29  C. Major, S. Steinicke, EU Member States’ Perceptions of Security.., op.cit., p. 6. 
30  Gjøa, www.gdfsuezep.no/en/About-us/Activities/Gjoa, web. September 22 2012.  
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Norge holds over forty exploration and extraction licenses (mainly natural gas) in 
the Barents Sea, the Northern Sea and the Norwegian Sea
31
. 
France is aware of the growing threat stemming from intensified marine traffic 
and potential leakages from tankers or wells. The significance of environmental 
safety in the Arctic has been emphasised a number of times. Therefore, France is 
for protection and separation of special environmental zones, which would also 
encompass fishing. Art. 2 of the Grenelle environmental act (2009) states that: 
“The Arctic region plays a key role in the global balance of the planet’s climate; 
France will support the creation of an international scientific observatory of the 
Arctic.”
32
 Furthermore, for the purpose of environmental protection, via proper 
international authorities, France will aim for adjustment of international provisions 
enabling greater access to exploration of the Arctic Ocean. Ambassador Rocard 
critically reacted to the rejection of the EC’s application for observer status and 
lobbied for adoption of a treaty guaranteeing protection of the natural environment 
of the region
33
. 
Great Britain 
Great Britain has an observer status in the Arctic Council. The British 
government decided not to publish a superior Arctic policy, but the Ministry of 
Defence prepared a strategy for the Arctic, which was approved by the Defence 
Council in December 2008. It confirmed that safety in the Arctic is also a military 
issue
34
. The United Kingdom’s objectives in the Arctic include
35
: 
− new navigation routes; 
− new sources of crude oil, gas, minerals and fishing; 
− possibility of exerting an impact on the international arena; 
− scientific studies on climate change and their impact on fauna. 
Great Britain depends more and more on import of fossil fuels. In the middle of 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century, British extraction of crude oil and gas in the 
Northern Sea reached its maximum level; thence, similarly to France, energy 
security is of key importance in the context of Arctic resources. British Petroleum 
exploits crude oil and gas deposits in Norwegian waters; furthermore, the concern 
failed in their attempts to tie up with Rosneft in 2011, which would have involved 
Arctic exploration. The government is mainly concerned about the security of sea 
trade routes. According to Liam Fox, the former British defence minister: “Due to 
the fact that 92% of British international trade of goods is transported by sea, we 
                                                 
31GDF SUEZ E&P Norge License Portfolio, www.gdfsuezep.no. 
32  Loi no 2009-967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de 
l'environnement (1). 
33  Un problème oublié : les pôles, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-north-pole-in-
peril/french, web. January 20 2013. 
34  Minister for International Defence and Security, at the Joint NATO/Icelandic Government 
conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, on 29 January 2009, Ministry of Defence Archives, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk, web. January 20 2013. 
35  Interests and roles of non-Arctic states.., op.cit., p. 9. 
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have to maintain strong sea interest, becoming involved in the issues of Arctic 
security”
36
. British insurance sector’s interest in the region is more and more 
noticeable.  
Denmark/ Greenland  
The EU’s attempt to become involved in the Arctic governance has met the 
resistance of the remaining players of the “Arctic 5” (A5), including an EU 
member state – Denmark, the main opponent of the EU Arctic policy. Denmark, 
the only EU member state that borders upon the Arctic (through Greenland), 
accepts a limited policy of the EU in Arctic issues (research, environmental 
protection). The Danish government adopted a state-centric stance and is more 
inclined to cooperation with the five Arctic coastal states. Denmark is involved in 
the issues of the Arctic outside the EU, partially even excluding European 
institutions and other member states (the divergence of Danish and community 
interests was confirmed by a conference in Ilulissat in Greenland between May 28 
and 29, 2008, where representatives of five Arctic states signed a one-page 
declaration stating the need for solving the disputable issues via an agreement 
within the scope of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf). 
Denmark perceives the Arctic policy to be enclosed within the A5 club or the 
Arctic Council and not in the EU. The strong players, such as Russia, the United 
States and Canada, share Denmark’s approach, which, as a small country, is 
treated equally with other powers and not as one of the 27 EU member states. In 
the Danish strategy for the Arctic 2011 – 2020, the government emphasised that 
“We must seek to avoid further cases where the laws, traditions, cultures and 
needs of Arctic societies are neglected, as for example in the EU’s ban on the 
import of seal products”
37
. 
For Denmark, Greenland’s policy poses a problem; Greenland is inhabited by 
only approx. 57,000 people, yet it more and more strongly attracts the greatest 
powers on account of the significant potential of natural resources (hydrocarbons, 
minerals, water), as well as from the point of view of the Arctic’s perspectives and 
its location within the centre of the “new border” of international relations
38
. 
Greenland is experiencing, as never before, unprecedented interest in its 
territories from many powers. The historic visit of the President of South Korea, 
Lee Myung-Bak, in Greenland in 2012 without a stop in Denmark and without the 
presence of the Danish prime minister, who is responsible for foreign policy and 
security in Denmark, almost provided Greenland with the status of an independent 
                                                 
36Liam Fox: The EU should only act when NATO cannot, 11.02.2010, http://www.conservatives.com 
/News/Speeches/2010/02/Liam_Fox_EU_should_only_act_when_NATO_cannot.aspx, web. January 
20 2013. 
37  Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, http://uk.nanoq.gl, web. January 22 
2013, p. 10. 
38  D. Degeorges, The Arctic. A region of the future for the European Union and the world economy, 
European issues, no 263, 8.01.2013, Foundation Robert Schuman, Policy Paper, p. 4. 
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state
39
. This can be explained by the fact that in 2010 Greenland became 
autonomous with respect to management of its own resources
40
. The growing 
significance of Greenland is confirmed by meetings of representatives of the 
United States, the EU, China and South Korea with the prime minister of 
Greenland
41
. Signing a letter of intent, whose purpose is establishing cooperation 
within the area of resources between the EU and Greenland during the visit of the 
deputy chairman of the EC, Antonio Tajani, in Greenland in 2012, raised hopes 
with respect to European plans for securing supplies of rare earth elements from 
Greenland
42
.  
The EU is aware of the fact that leaving Greenland under the influence of 
“foreign” economic assistance (from non-Arctic states) may lead to a loss of 
control over the policy of managing natural resources, and it puts both Greenland’s 
and EU’s interests at risk. The agreement between the Russian Rosnieft and the 
American concern ExxonMobil, the Norwegian Statoil and the Italian Eni, 
concluded between April and May 2012 on strategic cooperation in exploitation of 
resources from the area of the Karsk Sea, the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk, 
shows that a global “play” for resources in the Arctic has started; therefore, the EU 
has to show significant determination and unanimity in order not to lose its impact 
on the course of events in the region with respect to the policy of “accomplished 
facts” of Russia and in order not to be left behind other A5 states and non-Arctic 
actors, such as China and Korea, whose activity in the region and possibilities of 
financing are significant.  
Conclusions 
− The European Union has undetgone deep evolution and increased its 
involvement in Arctic issues, treating this region as one of the priority areas of 
engagement; however, so far it has not been possible to create a uniform EU 
Arctic policy. In consequence, the impact of EU activities in the Arctic 
remains slight in spite of the growing number of political documents referring 
to the problems of the region.  
− The objectives of the EU in the Arctic, apart from environmental aspects and 
counteracting climate change, more and more boldly emphasise economic and 
security issues related to the mineral resources of the region and the 
significance of navigation routes. The EU member states are interested in 
shorter and safer transport routes for goods towards the regions of economic 
boom in Asia. The Arctic also offers new possibilities within the scope of 
traditional sources of energy, i.e. crude oil and gas and, in the future, could 
play a key role in diversification of supplies of fossil fuels to the Community. 
                                                 
39  South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak in Ilulissat, Greenland Today, 10.09.2012. 
40  Arctic expert: Greenland could re-join the EU in a generation, EurActiv, 25.06.2012. 
41  D. Degeorges, The Arctic. A region of the future.., op.cit., p. 4. 
42  European Commission signs today agreement of cooperation with Greenland on raw materials, 
13.06.2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-600_en.htm, web. January 28 2013 
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Energy security is becoming a central element of the future external policy of 
the EU, whereas the prospect of rich resources and new transport routes has 
become the main incentive for the EU’s engagement in the Arctic region.  
− The EU’s readiness to play a more active role in the Arctic may collide with 
the interests of other rich states in the region. The United States, Canada and 
Russia prefer to act unilaterally in Arctic issues. Among the member states of 
the Community, Denmark also emphasises predominance of national interests 
over the interests of the remaining 26 member states. European institutions 
assumed the existence of a European interest in the Arctic region, yet failed to 
analyse how this interest is understood by the Arctic member states. Large 
European countries involved in the affairs of the Arctic should provide an 
impulse for the EU for closer cooperation among the member states.  
− The economic interests of the EU in the Arctic may contribute to the EU being 
accused of inconsistency in its activities and eventually loss of reliability. On 
the one hand, it promotes environmental protection and renewable energy 
sources, trying to attain a leading position in the fight against climate change, 
yet on the other hand allows for commercial exploitation of Arctic resources, 
which creates a serious risk for potential pollution of waters in the case of 
leakage, even if the highest security standards are applied, and which 
constitutes a potential threat to the local environment. Brussels emphasises that 
European industry and enterprises could be useful with their knowledge on 
combining sustainable development of the Arctic and use of its resources. The 
discrepancy between energy needs and environmental protection is, however, 
clear.  
− The growing strategic importance of the Arctic confirms the increased 
engagement of France, Germany and Great Britain in the High North. These 
countries, motivated by economic interests, defined their strategic interests 
with respect to the Arctic, among which securing energy supplies and 
protection of sea transport routes are the most important. These countries are 
also concerned about environmental issues and called for a joint strategy with 
respect to counteracting the causes and the results of climate change. Member 
states and the EU increased the level of the significance of security, which is 
no longer limited to traditional aspects (military and defence of territory), but 
takes into account new environmental and economic challenges (so called 
“soft” security problems, such as energy, pollution, communication, trade 
navigation) whose importance in the 21
st
 century will continue to grow. 
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Abstract 
Climate changes in the Arctic made the North Pole area a focal point for 
political interests of great powers. This brought questions: Is the Barents Sea an 
emerging region of new energy oil and gas supplies for the European Union? Will 
the High North resources play an important future role in diversification of 
European energy supplies? What is the UE’s role in the “game” for the Arctic? 
The article analyzes interests and conditions of Arctic policy of the EU and its 
selected Member States against the dynamic development of political and 
economic considerations in the Far North. 
 
Unia Europejska wobec Arktyki. 
Klimat i aspekty energetyczne w polityce arktycznej  
wybranych państw członkowskich 
Zmiany klimatyczne w Arktyce sprawiły, że wokół regionu Bieguna 
Północnego zogniskowały się interesy polityczne wielkich mocarstw. Zrodziło to 
pytania: Czy z Morza Barentsa wyłania się nowy region energetycznych dostaw 
ropy i gazu dla Unii Europejskiej? Czy zasoby Dalekiej Północy będą  
w przyszłości odgrywać ważna rolę w dywersyfikacji dostaw surowców do UE? 
Jaka jest rola UE w „grze” o Arktykę? Artykuł analizuje interesy  
i uwarunkowania polityki arktycznej UE oraz jej wybranych państw 
członkowskich na tle dynamicznego rozwoju uwarunkowań polityczno – 
gospodarczych na Dalekiej Północy. 
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